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Abstract
A group of nonscience forensic sciences has developed over the past century. These are ﬁelds within the broader forensic sciences that have little
or no basis in actual science. They are not applications of established
basic sciences, they have not systematically tested their own hypotheses, and they make unsupported assumptions and exaggerated claims.
This review explains the nature and origins of those nonscience forensic
ﬁelds, which include the forensic individualization sciences and certain
other areas, such as ﬁre and arson investigation. We explore the role of
the courts in maintaining the underdeveloped state of these ﬁelds and
consider suggestions for improving this state of affairs (addressing the
potential role that could be played by these ﬁelds themselves, by the
courts, and by normal sciences).
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INTRODUCTION
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Surprisingly little of what most people think
they know about major aspects of the forensic sciences is as they imagine it to be. This
review focuses on what a recent report of the
National Institute of Justice (2007) refers to
as the soft forensic sciences, or what might be
more accurately described as the nonscience
forensic sciences. The public appears to consider the various forensic sciences as one whole,
believing them all to be ﬂawless applications of
sound basic science to problems of law. Courts
generally share this view. As a Utah Court of
Appeals judge commented in regard to ﬁngerprint expert testimony: “In essence, we have
adopted a cultural assumption that a government representative’s assertion that a defendant’s ﬁngerprint was found at a crime scene
is an infallible fact, and not merely the examiner’s opinion” (State v. Quintana 2004, Thorne,
J., concurring, p. 171). The belief in ﬁngerprint
technology may be the most extreme example,
but it is by no means the only. The trust that
is laid upon the forensic sciences generally falls
somewhere between uncritical faith and manufactured myth.
The nonscience forensic sciences, as the
paradoxical phrase suggests, are those ﬁelds
within forensic science that have little or no
basis in actual science. They neither borrow
from established science nor systematically test
their hypotheses. Their primary claims for validity rest on anecdotal experience and proclamations of success over time. Hypothesis and
supposition are typically considered sufﬁcient.
Whereas in most scientiﬁc ﬁelds experience and
observation are designated as the ﬁrst steps of
the scientiﬁc method, for many forensic ﬁelds
they constitute the ﬁnal stages of conﬁrmation. Indeed, in a way, many practitioners of the
forensic arts have turned the scientiﬁc method
on its head. So long as their hypotheses and
suppositions have not been tested, they are assumed true. Hypotheses that endure over time,
rather than actually being tested, are deemed
proven. This model was once pervasive in
applied settings, especially in medicine, and
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produced such time-tested technologies as
bloodletting and phrenology.
The ﬁelds that most resemble those ancient
nonscience sciences are the forensic identiﬁcation sciences, as well as certain other specialties within forensic science. By identiﬁcation sciences we mean those subﬁelds that
often are referred to as criminalistics and that
involve pattern matching in an effort to associate a crime scene mark or object with its
source. These subﬁelds include the comparison of ﬁngerprints, handwriting, bitemarks,
voiceprints, toolmarks, ﬁrearms, tire prints,
shoe prints, and so on. Their goal is to link a
latent ﬁngerprint, a writing, a bitemark, a bullet, or similar objects to the one and only ﬁnger, writer, teeth, gun, or other speciﬁc object
in the world that made the markings. The ultimate objective, and postulated achievement,
of forensic identiﬁcation science is individualization, “[t]he process of placing an object in
a category which consists of a single, solitary
unit. Individualization implies uniqueness . . .”
(Thornton & Peterson 2008, p. 71). “Criminalistics is the science of individualization”
(Osterburg 1969, p. 97). For example, a ﬁrearms
examiner testifying in a federal court claimed to
be able to identify the unknown weapon “to the
exclusion of every other ﬁrearm in the world”
(U.S. v. Green 2005, p. 107).
Beyond the identiﬁcation sciences are certain other subﬁelds of forensic science that assert knowledge that was neither borrowed from
extant basic science nor rigorously tested by
forensic experts before being offered to courts.
These ﬁelds include the areas of ﬁre, arson and
explosives, gunshot residue, comparative bullet
lead analysis, and aspects of forensic pathology.
These areas of claimed expertise share with the
forensic identiﬁcation sciences the irrational
reliance on unspeciﬁed, unsystematic “experience” coupled with plausible-sounding arguments as the nearly exclusive bases for their
hypotheses.
The nonscience forensic sciences have failed
on several levels. They are scientiﬁc failures
in the sense that science (either in substance
or in methodology) played little more than a
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rhetorical part in the development of these
ﬁelds (Saks 2007). The word and the accoutrements of science were exploited to sell
these ﬁelds to courts and to the public (Cole
2001), but they did not trouble themselves to
build upon a foundation of substantive scientiﬁc knowledge or to employ the methods of
science to self-critically evaluate their wares.
They are also technological failures. The speciﬁc techniques that have been developed and
deployed in these ﬁelds make unknown numbers of errors—both false negatives (failing to
detect what they sought to detect, or to identify
what they sought to identify) and false positives
(seeming to detect something that did not exist,
mistakenly identifying an innocent person or
object as having been connected to the crime
under investigation). Yet despite these core
failures, the nonscience forensic sciences have
been extraordinarily “successful” as measured
by their admission into trial courts and their
apparent acceptance by the public. The reasons
for acclaim in the public domain is a subject beyond the scope of this review, although prominence on nightly television programs and in
feature-length movies must constitute part of
any explanation. Acceptance among courts and
lawyers, however, is somewhat easier to document, though possibly as difﬁcult to explain.
In this review, we focus on the nonscience
forensic sciences and consider the quandary of
how such profoundly ﬂawed disciplines could
achieve such worldly success. In examining this
puzzle, we explore three fundamental concerns.
The ﬁrst section considers the basic scientiﬁc
failure of these disciplines. This consideration
includes a brief survey of their historical origins
and a detailed analysis of their compositions,
in an effort to identify how they came to be
and to understand how they persist. The second
section considers the law’s role in perpetuating
these disciplines. Although courts provide the
primary markets for the experts coming from
these ﬁelds, they have done virtually nothing to
evaluate critically the bases for the opinions that
representatives from these ﬁelds offer into evidence. Finally, the third section looks forward
and asks how these nonscientiﬁc forensic sci-

ences might be made scientiﬁc and what such a
world might look like.

SCIENTIFIC FAILURES
Although science is not monolithic, the many
forms science assumes share certain characteristics. Perhaps foremost, good science has a
strong element of formality associated with it.
This formality permits what might be the key
attribute of the scientiﬁc method: reproducibility. Although postmodern sensibilities are wont
to stress objectivity as a keystone of science, virtually all science strives toward what Sir Karl
Popper (1949) called intersubjective testability.
In a nutshell, this means that the essential characteristics of any scientiﬁc test can be understood well enough to be replicated by another
group of researchers. Researchers must specify
all the details employed in testing the hypothesis of interest so that outsiders can know just
what was done. This requires clear statements
of operational deﬁnitions, full exposition of research methods employed and statistics used,
and strict limits on the degree of subjectiveness
relied upon in reaching judgments or conclusions. The scientiﬁc method, therefore, is not
merely a way of testing hypotheses; it permits
outsiders to know how the tests were conducted
and allows other researchers to repeat and conﬁrm them.
From the law’s perspective, as a consumer of
scientiﬁc opinion, knowing what methods were
used to support various theories or hypotheses should be an imperative. Without knowing
in detail how (and whether) a ﬁeld tested its
hypotheses, it is impossible for courts to know
how valuable, if valuable at all, expert opinions
are that come from that ﬁeld. Although anecdotal experience sometimes produces valuable
knowledge, without veriﬁable tests it is impossible to know when it does so.
Ostensibly scientiﬁc expert opinion, therefore, must be evaluated on the basis of fundamental principles of good hypothesis testing. Unfortunately, as this section describes,
much of forensic science fails this basic test.
The nonscience forensic sciences have largely
www.annualreviews.org • Failed Forensics
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developed outside of mainstream science and
are not premised on the basic sciences. Moreover, their essential hypotheses have been subjected to few if any serious tests, and indeed,
their primary hypothesis of individualization
may be inherently impossible to test. Absent
real testing that can be replicated by other researchers and independently veriﬁed by courts,
forensic identiﬁcation science is not really
science at all.
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No Basic-Science Origins
Although forensic science is routinely deﬁned
as “the application of science to problems of
law,” this description does not ﬁt the subﬁelds
of forensic science that are concerned with individualization. Although knowledge from organic chemistry can be brought to bear in
identifying what drugs, poisons, or medications might be discovered in a corpse found
at a crime scene, what knowledge from conventional sciences like biology or chemistry or
physics support the notion of individualization?
To what university science department does one
go, what course does one take, to learn the basic
scientiﬁc research that undergirds the notion
that no two ﬁrearms impart indistinguishably
similar markings or that reveals how one knows
when a questioned writing was made by one
writer rather than another?
Even a cursory review of major university
course catalogs quickly reveals that nothing
could supply a knowledge base for the forensic identiﬁcation sciences. Only a relative handful of schools nationally have forensic science
departments, and most of those are devoted
to teaching the technologies of the past rather
than testing the limits of these technologies or
developing their scientiﬁc foundations. More
telling, and more troubling, forensic issues are
rarely taken up by academic scientists of any
kind. Statisticians have generally ignored the
subject, although they regularly investigate parallel problems, such as signal-detection theory
(Swets 1973, Phillips et al. 2001).
In the nineteenth century, science was as
likely to be found outside the university struc152
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ture as it was to be found inside it. This was
particularly true in the United States, where
the university itself was not fully formed until
the twentieth century (Rudolph 1990 [1962],
Thelin 2004). It was not unusual for serious
science to be explored by wealthy amateurs.
Benjamin Franklin and Charles Darwin are particularly well-known exemplars of this model.
But, over time, science became increasingly institutionally based, and by the mid-twentieth
century most science was done by professionals
associated with universities. These departments
housed communities of scientists, set standards
of acceptable practice, and educated succeeding generations of researchers. Perhaps most
importantly, these departments embodied and
promoted a culture of scientiﬁc curiosity and
adventure. In the best science departments, this
combined a commitment to well-demonstrated
methodological and statistical practices and encouraged innovation and creativity in hypothesis formation. Although science departments
achieved such cultural ideals imperfectly and
not invariably, the incredible success of the
academic model in the twentieth century is
undeniable.
Most of the forensic identiﬁcation sciences,
however, missed the school bus. They never
joined the university system. Although hardly
surprising, but worse still, they instead became
an integrated component of the police apparatus. They became an instrument of law enforcement, largely controlled by police technicians and their superiors. Innovation, such
as it existed, was done by nonscientiﬁcally
trained, albeit mostly well-meaning, bureaucrats. As novel technologies came into being,
a bureaucratic mindset controlled their application. They were not subjected to systematic empirical testing before being offered as
testimony—or, as Cole (2007) puts it, they
followed a testify-ﬁrst-validate-later approach
(see also Cooley 2004, Pyrek 2007). Whereas
the scientiﬁc ideal promotes constant questioning, the bureaucratic inclination is the reverse. Forensic identiﬁcation science embraced
the bureaucratic ideal of perpetuating the status quo (Wilson 1989). Substantial questioning,
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testing, rethinking, and innovation in handwriting or toolmark identiﬁcation, for instance,
would not only mean that those trained in the
old ways would be in danger of becoming obsolete; it also would mean that much of what they
had testiﬁed to in the past, on which courts had
relied, might come under a cloud of doubt.
This unfortunate state of affairs was compounded by the realities of judicial practice and
reasoning, in two basic respects. First, the legal
culture itself is inconsistent with the scientiﬁc
perspective. In law, stare decisis operates as the
core working premise, a view in fundamental
tension with the idea of scientiﬁc progress. The
habit of judges to defer to prior decisions disinclines appellate courts to revisit possible (or actual) errors by trial courts in any given case, and
it leads trial judges to admit species of evidence
that appellate courts had approved in the past,
regardless of how ﬂawed that type of evidence
can be shown to be with current knowledge.
Second, lawyers had, and continue to have, little
training in the basic methods of science. They
do not know how to think about validation of
science claims or how to frame an assessment
of such claims. In particular, most lawyers have
little or no training in statistics, a key element of
the applied sciences of which forensics should
have been a part. Many lawyers simply could
not distinguish between real science and pretensions to science. Lawyers—on both sides—
who did (and do) know the difference often
were too overwhelmed by resource limitations
and caseload pressures to be able to mount a
meaningful challenge to the evidence. Moreover, scientiﬁcally naive courts were sometimes
romanced by the claim that they were being
presented with science by scientists—terms appropriated by police forensic personnel even
though much of what they do would be described in more conventional scientiﬁc workplaces as the work of technicians. At the same
time, other courts were complicit in what they
realized was a parody of science but that they,
too, saw as useful in achieving convictions.
DNA proﬁling is the exception that proves
the rule. DNA was discovered in 1953 by scientists working in academic science departments

(Morange 2000). The value of this discovery
for law enforcement was obvious. If everyone
has virtually unique DNA, and a copy of every person’s DNA is contained in every cell of
his or her body, then a technology that can
proﬁle DNA found in material left at crime
scenes should be a boon to law enforcement.
Once DNA technologies permitted individual
identiﬁcations, both scientists and lawyers immediately appreciated its power. In just over a
decade, DNA technology progressed through
several iterations and various advances, including RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism) techniques, PCR (polymerase chain
reaction) testing, and mitochondrial DNA analysis. Today, although academic scientists continue to monitor and reﬁne DNA forensics, the
technology is largely mechanical and operated
by technicians who have little understanding of
the scientiﬁc or statistical bases underlying the
protocols they follow. The history of forensic
DNA is almost a paradigm of how basic science
can contribute systematically and systemically
to forensics.
If forensic individualization science had
emerged from normal science, its approach and
its techniques probably would resemble DNA
typing, with its measurement of attributes, sampling of variation in populations, and statistical
bases. Error rates, probability levels, conﬁdence
intervals, and so on would be natural parts of
what developed. The elements of subjectivity
in forensic examination would themselves be
topics of research, to understand both their operation and how to tame them.
The nonscience forensic sciences, however,
followed a separate path. They were not incorporated into university science departments and
ever since have remained orphaned. They became instruments of police and prosecutors. In
this capacity, they have always been evaluated
by their success in court. By this measure, they
have been a sensation. But their success as science, measured by such pedestrian concepts as
reliability and validity, is considerably less certain. It is uncertain because it is unknown. Their
basic hypotheses have not been tested in any
rigorous or systematic way. By any reasonable
www.annualreviews.org • Failed Forensics
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measure of science, then, these forensic ﬁelds
are failures.

Impossibility of Individualization

Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2008.4:149-171. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org
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Possibly the most fundamental error made by
the identiﬁcation branches of the nonscience
forensic sciences is the statement of the basic
hypothesis of their ﬁelds. They repeatedly claim
the ability to individualize. In other words, a
basic operating premise of their expertise, they
claim, is the ability to say that some trace evidence (e.g., a latent ﬁngerprint, markings on
a bullet, or a shoe imprint) was made by a
particular source (e.g., ﬁnger, gun, or shoe) to
the exclusion of all other possible sources in
the world. This is a form of Sir Karl Popper’s white swan problem (Saks 1998), which
he used to demonstrate the limits of the inductive method (i.e., expertise based on simple experience or observation). Popper (1959)
asked his readers to consider the hypothesis that
“all swans are white.” This hypothesis might
be tested by the experience of observing 1000
swans, all of which are white. But no matter how
many swans are observed, the possibility always
remains of ﬁnding a nonwhite swan. Upon ﬁnding, say, a black swan, a researcher would have
to modify his hypothesis, perhaps positing that
“99.9% of swans are white,” a hypothesis similarly susceptible to rigorous test but immune
to certain proof. Popper concluded that even
though hypotheses could not be conclusively
proven true, they could be rigorously tested—
that is, scientists could attempt to falsify them.
Most working scientists would recognize this
Popperian model as representing the essence
of what they do on a day-to-day basis (as a
community, though not necessarily as individuals). The assertion of the ability to individualize not only was not tested; the very framing
of the hypothesis is highly vulnerable to falsiﬁcation. When falsiﬁcation inevitably occurs in
each nonscience forensic science subﬁeld—by
“different” being mistaken as the “same” or the
“same” being mistaken as “different”—rather
than revise the core hypothesis to a more plausible and probabilistic one, practitioners either
154
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completely ignore the evidence of falsiﬁcation
or seek ways to explain away the falsiﬁcations
in order to keep insisting there are none.
In fact, it appears that “[i]ndividualization
is unique to forensic science” (DeForest et al.
1983, p. 7). Conventional science has nothing to say about individualization. Individualization was invented by police investigators to
meet a criminal justice system need, namely,
to try to discover who had committed a crime
(Thornton 1975) and to secure a conviction.
In seeking to establish pinpoint linkages between crime scene evidence and known exemplars, the forensic identiﬁcation sciences sought
to do what no other ﬁeld had ever tried to do and
about which no other ﬁeld has developed any
basic science knowledge. Although individualization is the centerpiece of numerous forensic
science subﬁelds, a recent review argues that no
theoretical or empirical basis for individualization exists, and none is likely to come into being in the foreseeable future (Saks & Koehler
2008). Interestingly, numerous forensic scientists recognize that a scientiﬁc basis for such
identiﬁcation does not exist and that practitioners are making a leap of faith when they offer
individualization testimony in court (Inman &
Rudin 2001; Stoney 2001, 1991; Bowers 2008;
and others).
Forensic individualization begins with the
recognition that the ﬁne physical features of
objects and the marks they leave (bitemarks or
toolmarks, for example) vary. But rather than
measuring that variability and carefully assessing the degree to which it reduces the pool
of objects that could have been the source of
the questioned evidence, systematically and rigorously taking into account the quality and
amount of the questioned markings, all but one
or two of the forensic identiﬁcation sciences
(those one or two being DNA typing and microscopic hair comparison) quickly adopted a belief
in uniqueness: that no two objects could leave
indistinguishably similar residua or markings.
Much rides on this belief. If true, it eliminates
the need to collect systematic data to assess variability. It leads to the belief that if two marks
are indistinguishable they must have originated
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from the same object “to the exclusion of all
others in the world.” And, by a more obscure
route, it has led many forensic examiners to believe that the possibility of error is (or borders
on) zero.
The notion of uniqueness originated in the
nineteenth century with Quételet, who hypothesized that “nature never repeats,” offering the
product rule of probability theory to suggest
great odds against such repetition (Cole 2001).
Bertillon, a police records clerk in Paris, applied the idea to the classiﬁcation of prisoners and invented anthropometry. Though never
proven empirically and impossible to prove statistically, several generations of forensic scientists have repeated the mantra. The founders
of each forensic identiﬁcation subﬁeld invoked
the product rule (see Saks & Koehler 2008).
Thus, forensic identiﬁcation science has taken
a fundamental insight (variability produced by
random effects) and exaggerated it into an unfounded but strongly held faith in uniqueness
and (virtual) freedom from error. For example,
Cummins & Midlo (1943 [1961]) undertook
an extensive effort to prove that no two ﬁngerprints could be indistinguishably alike, but
in the end conceded failure: “[I]t is impossible to offer decisive proof that no two ﬁngerprints bear identical patterns.” Speaking of the
futility of relying on probability theory, they
wrote, “It is unfortunate that this approach
carries the implication that a complete correspondence of two patterns might occur. . . .”
More recently, Stoney (1991) constructed an
article around the question, “What made us
ever think we could individualize using statistics?” In the ﬁeld of handwriting identiﬁcation,
Harris (1958) showed that many people with
the same name sign their names indistinguishably similarly, a vitally important disconﬁrmation of a core assumption that has been almost completely ignored by forensic document
examiners.
Let us be clear: Efforts to identify the person who is the source of a latent ﬁngerprint
deposited at a crime scene will likely be successful much of the time, most of the time, or
nearly all of the time. That it is impossible to

say how often is symptomatic of the larger problem. No one knows how often errors occur or
what factors promote or prevent errors. That
is because systematic empirical research on the
foundations of handwriting identiﬁcation, on
its performance in practice, or on what should
constitute best practices had been all but nonexistent for a century. Research showing foundational claims to be untrue or unprovable was
simply ignored by the ﬁeld (see, e.g., Cole 2005,
Cummins & Midlo 1943 [1961]). Research suggesting improved practices was disregarded in
favor of traditional practices (Risinger et al.
2002). When the ﬁrst Daubert challenge was
posed to asserted ﬁngerprint expertise, proponents found themselves with so little research
or any other real evidence to offer in support
of their claims that in an effort to close the
knowledge gap they launched two studies in
mid-pretrial of that ﬁrst challenge. This is a remarkable situation for a ﬁeld to ﬁnd itself in
after a century of admission to courts.
The absence of knowledge has been ﬁlled
with assertions supported by little more than
intuition, anecdote, and ipse dixit. In the place
of systematic research, the ﬁeld developed a set
of faith-based beliefs that are more akin to a
religion or an ideology than to a science but
that have largely succeeded in making all possible difﬁculties disappear, at least in the eyes of
courts, fact ﬁnders, and the public. These unproved (and sometimes unprovable) assertions
include such notions as that the error rate of ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation is zero; that the theory
and the technique are ﬂawless; that errors that
do come to light always result from misapplication of the technique, not from the technique;
that no two people have ﬁngerprints that are
indistinguishably alike (or confusable one for
another); and so on.
These beliefs sidestep the real issues that examiners and courts need to be concerned about.
The claim of uniqueness—be it true or false,
provable or unprovable—is largely irrelevant.
By analogy, assuming all faces are unique does
not mean that one is never mistaken for another.
The real problems are that latent prints are typically partial (a fraction of a ﬁngerprint) and/or
www.annualreviews.org • Failed Forensics
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of varying quality (smudged, distorted, overlaid
with other marks). They are compared by examiners who work with no objective guidelines
and who must use their judgment to reach a
conclusion that is required to be of absolute
subjective certainty (if a conclusion is reached).
Like DNA typing, the problem facing ﬁngerprint examiners is actually to estimate the population frequency of the attributes observed in
the latent print and the known print and to estimate how many equally good matches exist
in the population. The likelihood of mistakes
(almost certainly) depends on numerous factors that have not been systematically studied
and that are dealt with haphazardly in practice
(Budowle 2006). Research to answer the questions implied in this paragraph would bring us
closer to knowing how well examiners perform
the task for which they are testifying or, as
Daubert and Kumho Tire conceive the inquiry,
the task at hand in the case before the court.
For now, courts and the public will hear only
the exaggerated, faith-based answers.
What we have just said about ﬁngerprints
can be multiplied across all the conventional
forensic identiﬁcation sciences. The good news
is that research has begun, in ﬁts and starts,
more in some ﬁelds than in others. Some ﬁelds
might be found to be so weak that they must
be limited to no more than an investigatory
role, not courtroom testimony. (This seems to
have been the fate, for example, of voiceprints
and compositional bullet lead analysis.) Others
might be found to be more solid than they are
currently regarded by informed commentators
(e.g., Thornton & Peterson 2008). Some day
better answers will be known. But not yet.
Consider the so-called ACE-V technique,
claimed primarily by ﬁngerprint examiners,
though starting to be picked up by other identiﬁcation sciences. The acronym stands for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Veriﬁcation.
The analysis step has the examiner look at the
quality and quantity of detail that is present, often aided by magniﬁcation of some sort. The
comparison step usually calls upon the examiner to compare the trace evidence to a candidate source. At the evaluation step, the exam-
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iner forms an opinion regarding individualization, though, as noted above, this is not guided
by any formal standards or statistical criteria.
Finally, the last stage involves the reexamination by a second examiner of the trace and
reputed source material to verify the match,
though that person almost always knows the
ﬁrst examiner’s conclusion (Stoney 2008). Just
about everything that is wrong with today’s
forensics can be found embedded somewhere
within the ACE-V system. Each step calls for
a subjective impression guided by no objective
standards.
Latent ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation is a problem that should be readily amenable to testing,
considering the amount of time and attention
given to it, not to mention the availability of
digital databases of ﬁngerprints. Latent prints
typically are partial ﬁngerprints found at the
scene of the crime (or other place of interest)
and can vary greatly in general quality as well
as in the quantity of detail available for analysis. For the analysis step of the ACE-V method,
however, there has yet to be any systematic attempt to determine the frequency of the ﬁngerprint minutiae (e.g., ridge characteristics) that
are analyzed and subsequently used for comparison. Suppose an examiner ﬁnds ﬁve minutiae that “match” between the latent print and
a known print. The meaning of that degree of
similarity depends entirely on the frequency of
occurrence in the population for each of the ﬁve
characteristics and, further, whether they are
statistically independent of one another. Without more, the probability of randomly ﬁnding
ﬁve characteristics that match is somewhere between 0.0001 and 0.9999. Nothing in the ACEV method permits ﬁngerprint examiners to say
what the likelihood of ﬁnding a match is. Indeed, ﬁngerprint examiners refuse to estimate
probabilities; they merely insist that their subjective judgments amount to certainties.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that
the kinds of information criminalists bring to
the crime-solving process are useless. They can
be of enormous help in narrowing the pool of
suspect persons or objects. But everyday examiners have ignored their ﬁelds’ own cautionary
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literature, and the claims of the ﬁelds have
been woefully underresearched and oversold to
courts and to the public.
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Absence of Empirical Testing
Even though most of the nonscience forensic
sciences had no basic science to build upon, as
self-proclaimed sciences they might have conducted their own empirical research to test the
beliefs on which their work and their conclusions relied. But they did virtually no such
research.
As one example, after reviewing the literature in their own ﬁeld of forensic odontology in search of the basis for the ﬁeld’s beliefs that it can individualize bitemarks, Pretty
& Sweet (2001) concluded, “Despite the continued acceptance of bitemark evidence in
European, Oceanic and North American
Courts, the fundamental scientiﬁc basis for
bitemark analysis has never been established.”
Risinger et al. (1989) scoured the handwriting identiﬁcation literature and found essentially no research testing whether such asserted
experts could do what they purported to be
able to do. In the area of ﬁrearms identiﬁcation, some ﬁrearms and toolmark examiners
have been working to place their judgments
on more systematic empirical footing (Biasotti
et al. 2008). This program, while admirable, remains some distance from completion and has
not been embraced by most ﬁrearms examiners.
For a critical review of the ﬁeld, see Schwartz
(2005).
There are no systematic, rigorous, empirical research bases on which the great majority
of beliefs in the nonscience forensic sciences are
built. (For detailed discussion of various forensic sciences, see relevant chapters of Faigman
et al. 2008.) If called upon to prove their claims,
they have little or no data to marshal in their
ﬁeld’s defense. Instead, they generally point to a
guild of mutually self-reassuring examiners who
have come to believe in the truth of their claims,
often sounding more like a faith-based religion
than a data-based science (see, e.g., Moenssens
1998).

As Giannelli & Imwinkelried (2000) have
noted, in each area of the nonscience forensic sciences, “little rigorous, systematic research
has been done to validate the discipline’s basic premises and techniques, and in each area
there is no evident reason why such research
would be infeasible.” For example, until fairly
recently, the ﬁeld of ﬁre and arson investigation
relied on intuition and imagination to develop a
set of what came to be accepted as indicators of
arson. They came to believe that crazed glass,
spalled concrete, certain types of burn patterns,
and so on indicated ﬁres that had been deliberately set. Untold numbers of cases, both criminal and civil, were decided on the strength of
such experts applying those beliefs and opining
on whether they thought a particular ﬁre was arson or accident. Eventually, those beliefs were
put to empirical tests in which buildings were
set aﬁre in ways that simulated either arson ﬁres
or accidental ﬁres. By comparing the effects of
the arson versus accidental ﬁres on windows,
walls, burn patterns, and so on, these conceptually simple experiments revealed that many
of the accepted indicators of arson did not, in
fact, distinguish arson from accidental ﬁres. In
light of the research ﬁndings, the ﬁeld began
to abandon those incorrect beliefs and adopt
more accurate beliefs based on systematic empirical testing (Lentini 2008). Of course, some
investigators learn of or come to accept the new
discoveries more slowly than others. And an unaddressed concern is all of the past verdicts of
criminal and civil liability or denial of insurance
claims that were made in error, relying on the
expert opinions that relied on untested beliefs
that now are recognized to be false.

Little Use of Scientific Methods
Scientists have a way of using the scientiﬁc
method in much of what they do. For example, in trying to determine what testing procedures produce the most accurate results, they
might try out different ones and compare the
results obtained. The ones that consistently facilitate more accurate results would be adopted
as the standard procedure, the state of the art.
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Similarly, systematic experiments can be conducted on different training procedures to determine which work best and which enable
trainees to acquire the most effective skills most
efﬁciently. Those are then adopted. These sorts
of efforts are largely absent from the nonscience
forensic sciences, and in their place are committed beliefs in the validity of the unproven.
Most immediately serious and troubling,
whereas conventional scientists design studies
and procedures to maximize the contribution
of the phenomenon under scrutiny and minimize the contribution of expectations and biases (in particular, using blind or masked tests
so as not to be misled into seeing what they want
or hope or expect to see), forensic scientists—
alone among those who regard themselves as
scientists—do not employ such procedures and
insist that they are not affected by such context effects (Risinger et al. 2002). Most scientists
would suspect that knowing other inculpatory
evidence in a case could distort the conclusions
of someone judging and interpreting other evidence in a case, but forensic scientists have insisted that they can will themselves not to be
vulnerable to this phenomenon.
However, recent research by Dror and colleagues no longer permits such denials. For instance, Dror et al. (2006) found that four out of
ﬁve ﬁngerprint experts who had several years
earlier identiﬁed two prints as a match later
reached different conclusions on their second
encounter with those same prints, when each
examiner was told that others had declared the
prints to be from different persons. Although
context effects are usually found to be small but
persistent (usually leading to error rates of a few
percent at most), 80% of Dror et al.’s ﬁngerprint examiners changed their opinions when
presented with misleading contextual information. (See also Dror & Charlton 2006.) A recent
meta-analysis of these data found an effect size
of r = 0.40, which is quite large for context
effects (Dror & Rosenthal 2008). A famous ﬁngerprint error by the FBI, in which several of
their most senior examiners one after another
erroneously identiﬁed a latent print in a terrorist bombing in Madrid as belonging to an
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Oregon lawyer who had no connection at all
to the bombing, has been attributed partly to
context effects (Stacey 2004). (For descriptions
of other cases of ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation errors, see Cole 2005.) Such research results and
incidents suggest that criminalists should employ the same kind of blind examination procedures that are used widely in other ﬁelds. To
date, however, forensic scientists continue with
business as usual.

Error Management
Normal scientists do not deny error. Quite
the contrary: They have been obsessed with
the measurement and reporting of error at
least since the Greek astronomers. Today, most
scientists have made statistics—the study of
uncertainty—an integral part of how they think
and what they do, and they work closely with
statisticians. Research studies report probability levels, specify conﬁdence intervals, present
error bars on graphs, and so on. They not only
measure and report error, scientists study error,
explore its sources, and work to manage it. In
striking contrast, most forensic scientists, especially criminalists, pretend that error does not
exist in their work. This is most plain in the
work of ﬁngerprint examiners, who insist that
their error rate is zero and who declare the reporting of a qualiﬁed identiﬁcation (meaning
an identiﬁcation accompanied by a probability
statement of less than 100% certainty) to be an
unethical act.
The forensic expert’s crabbed understanding
of error is well illustrated in the case of U.S. v.
Allen (2002), in which the issue was the admissibility of footwear identiﬁcation techniques.
The court observed as follows:
With respect to the rate of error in the ACE-V
[i.e., analysis, comparison, evaluation, and veriﬁcation] process, [the expert] testiﬁed that the
error rate of the process itself is zero, meaning
that based upon the science, the shoe either
did or did not make the impression. Any error
that does occur, according to [the expert] is
caused by examiner error in the application of
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the process or by examiner error in reaching a
particular conclusion (p. 862).

A theoretical error rate of zero should be reassuring to no one. No technology has a zero
error rate or failure rate in practice, whether
the fault lies with the method, the operator, or
most likely both. To say that the suspect shoe
either did or did not make the impression is a
metaphysical statement that addresses neither
the real concerns about the ability to associate
any given shoe with such a mark nor the various
risks of error associated with any inference related to whether it did or did not. Courts, after
all, operate in the real world, not the world of
metaphysical imaginings. To even suggest that
footwear identiﬁcation techniques have a zero
error rate, based on some theoretical belief that
every shoeprint is unique, is simply rhetoric, not
science.
Claims of zero error rates are particularly
ironic given that all individualization sciences
(with the exception of DNA typing) rely exclusively on each examiner’s subjective judgment to assess the commonness or rarity of
features (of ﬁngerprints, toolmarks, etc.), because no efforts have been made to determine
the population frequency of those features (except of DNA). Indeed, DNA evidence, the gold
standard in forensic identiﬁcation, is itself susceptible to an assortment of potential sources
of error. These include, among others, errors
in collecting biological material, mislabeling
of evidence, accidental contamination of samples, and, sometimes, intentional fraud. All the
potential sources of error that plague DNA
identiﬁcation also threaten other kinds of
forensic evidence. But with the latter, we have
little or no idea of the random match probabilities. As Stoney (2008) has pointed out, “The
criteria for absolute identiﬁcation in ﬁngerprint
work are subjective and ill-deﬁned. They are
the product of probabilistic intuitions widely
shared among ﬁngerprint examiners, not of scientiﬁc research” (p. 360). It may seem paradoxical that a ﬁeld whose work is so lacking
in objective measurement, and whose decisions
turn on subjective judgment, would eschew the

analysis of probability and error. But for several reasons it should not be surprising. When
one has no objective measurements, the calculation of error and probabilities is more difﬁcult.
Moreover, this scientiﬁcally odd behavior likely
is a product of the adversary system. Forensic
scientists are trapped in the crossﬁre of prosecutors who want evidence to be as airtight as
it can be and defense attorneys who will look
for any daylight that might be seeping through
the government’s case. It has been suggested
that over the decades forensic examiners have
been pressured to make statements as extreme
as they can get—100% certainty, zero error
rates, identiﬁcation to the exclusion of all others in the world—not because such statements
grow out of their science, but because they serve
the needs of those who use their work (Saks
1998).
Prominent forensic science thinkers have
questioned these implausible conventions.
Thornton & Peterson (2008) have observed:
“[T]hough individualization is clearly the goal
toward which forensic science strives, it can
be achieved only in a probabilistic sense, of
reducing uncertainty to the smallest possible
amount . . .” (p. 7). “Behind every opinion rendered by a forensic scientist there is a statistical
basis. We may not know what that basis is, and
we may have no feasible means of developing
an understanding of that basis, but it is futile to
deny that one exists” (p. 22). Champod & Evett
(2001) have argued that “there is, at present, a
major contradiction between the scientiﬁc status that is claimed and the operational paradigm
to which its practitioners subscribe. This contradiction is exempliﬁed by a recent statement
by . . . SWGFAST [Scientiﬁc Working Group
on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology]: ‘Friction ridge identiﬁcations are absolute
conclusions. Probable, possible, or likely identiﬁcation are outside the acceptable limits of the
science of friction ridge identiﬁcation’” (p. 432).
Champod & Evett pose these challenging questions: “Is a statement of an ‘absolute conclusion’
compatible with scientiﬁc reasoning? Is the denial of probabilistic reasoning compatible with
a scientiﬁc pursuit?”
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Moreover, claims of no error and no possibility of error ﬂy in the face of studies revealing errors in casework (Cole 2005), in proﬁciency testing (see Thornton & Peterson 2008),
and in other studies (e.g., Dror et al. 2006,
Dror & Charlton 2006, Kam et al. 1997). (For
more extensive reviews, see Volumes 4 and 5 of
Faigman et al. 2008.) The irony may be that
by denying the possibility of error, forensic scientists have denied themselves the opportunity
to understand better the sources of error and
to manage error better. Lest one think that errors hurt only defendants, bear in mind that by
setting a decision threshold so high that one declares an identiﬁcation only when one is “100%
sure,” the incidence of false negative errors is
increased (Phillips et al. 2001, Haber & Haber
2003).
Surprisingly, forensic science expert evidence appears to be one of the leading causes of
erroneous convictions, second only to eyewitness testimony (see Figure 1).
As discussed in regard to the ACE-V method
above, forensic individualization science involves two fundamental steps. The ﬁrst step
is to compare a questioned item of evidence
to an exemplar from a known source and to
judge whether they appear so alike that they can
be said to match. The second step is to assess
the meaning of that reported match: What is the
probability that the questioned and the known
originated from one and the same source? Different risks of error are present at each step. The
risk of error in the ﬁrst step is that a reported
match between a questioned and known sample might not really match. Even if the method
used to compare questioned and known samples
were ﬂawless, an error could occur if, for example, one of the samples had been mislabeled
or mixed up with a different sample. The risk
of error associated with the second step is that
the reported match may be accurate but arose
through coincidence (the random match problem) rather than because the samples share a
common source. The risks of error at both steps
affect the ultimate inferences that can be drawn
about the identiﬁcation evidence in a case. (For
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more thorough discussion, see Thompson &
Cole 2006.)
Both risks are signiﬁcantly underresearched.
As to the ﬁrst step, existing standards and procedures do not provide sufﬁcient protection from
erroneous conclusions that two marks are indistinguishably alike—that is, that they match
when in fact they differ. Few, if any, criminalistics subﬁelds have objective standards for deciding whether two patterns match. That determination is left to the subjective judgment of
each examiner. For example, consider Stoney’s
(2001) discussion of ﬁngerprint examination
standards:
How much correspondence between two ﬁngerprints is sufﬁcient to conclude that they
[are the same pattern] . . . ? An adequate answer . . . is not currently available. The best answer at present . . . is that this is up to the individual expert ﬁngerprint examiner to determine, based on that examiner’s training, skill,
and experience. Thus, we have an ill-deﬁned,
ﬂexible, and explicitly subjective criterion for
establishing ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation. . . . Any
unbiased, intelligent assessment of ﬁngerprint
identiﬁcation practices today reveals that there
are, in reality, no standards (p. 329).

The lack of objective standards helps explain some disturbing ﬁndings from the small
body of research on pattern matching by
forensic scientists that has been conducted to
date. In some tests, examiners disagreed with
one another about whether various images
matched (see proﬁciency studies summarized in
Faigman et al. 2008). In other tests, examiners who agreed that two patterns matched disagreed (sometimes dramatically) on what constituted the match (Evett & Williams 1996).
Examiners differ not only in their ability to perceive pattern similarity and differences, but also
in their thresholds for calling matches.
As to certainty of forensic identiﬁcations,
FBI forensic scientist Bunch (2000) has noted:
“[I]t must be observed that there is no rational or scientiﬁc ground for making claims
of absolute certainty in any of the traditional
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identiﬁcation sciences, which include ﬁngerprint, document, ﬁrearms, toolmark, and shoe
and tire-tread analysis.”
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ILLUSORY JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
The courts, and the legal profession more
generally, have been remarkably ineffective in
policing forensic science. With only a few notable exceptions, courts have not closely evaluated the scientiﬁc bases for forensic identiﬁcation and have not been responsible for
exposing the ﬂaws in any of the forensic science
ﬁelds that have, over time, been abandoned owing to their lack of validity. For reasons that will
become clear in this section, the failures of the
courts are intimately connected to the failures
of the forensic sciences.
The reasons for the courts’ empirical ineffectuality are likely manifold. Three systemic
factors, in particular, appear to explain much
regarding the courts’ failures in this area. The
ﬁrst, and most basic, is the cultural divide that
separates law and science. Outside of legal content areas such as intellectual property, patents,
and the environment, lawyers have little training in the basic precepts of research methodology and statistics. Although law school could
be described as a gloriﬁed liberal arts education, it generally does not include courses in research methods and statistics. Even where such
courses are available, they are taken by a small
percentage of students. The second factor inevitably affecting the law’s insouciance is the
standard by which courts judge the probative
value of expert evidence. During most of the
twentieth century the courts used admissibility
tests that were either explicitly deferential to the
professional ﬁelds that supplied the expertise or
operated deferentially as a practical matter. Although modern admissibility standards appear
to mandate a less indolent review of proffered
expertise, little has changed on the criminal
side of courts’ dockets. This may be a function
either of courts’ inclination to grandfather in
expertise traditionally admitted or of some predisposition that favors evidence offered by prosecutors. The third factor is the ironic situation

that because nonscience forensic science is not
scientiﬁc, there are few defense experts available to testify. Most scientiﬁc ﬁelds are highly
dynamic and often hotbeds of debate and disagreement about the meaning of their research
and the content and reach of their theories. Real
science teaches doubt. Good faith disagreement
among scientists spills over into the courtroom
and provides fodder for the adversarial process.
Although the courtroom is an imperfect forum
for resolving scientiﬁc disagreement, this dialectic at least produces considerable information for courts to ponder. Nonscience forensic science creates no similar content in large
part because group consensus substitutes for
science.
These systemic challenges might combine
to help make judicial ignorance of the methods of science seem easy to understand. Yet it
still remains quite puzzling. Although law is a
distinct institution with its own goals and objectives, it constantly interacts with the world and
institutions around it. The law receives input
from a variety of sources, digests it through the
legal process, and applies the output with the expectation of effecting some result. These steps
require judges to have extraordinarily broad understanding of an assortment of professional
disciplines. For instance, judges routinely rely
on historical sources, particularly in constitutional cases, and it would be remarkable if they
either eschewed responsibility for understanding it critically or employed it in plainly ignorant ways. Yet when it comes to science, and
particularly statistics, judges pause and sputter, wondering whether it is truly part of their
responsibility to know the details of scientiﬁc
methods. On occasions when judges are required to think in a critically scientiﬁc way, the
results can be inane.
A particularly trenchant example of this
inanity can be found in the case of U.S. v.
Havvard (2000). The Havvard court attempted
to justify its decision to admit ﬁngerprint expert testimony in a written opinion that inadvertently does just the opposite. The court employed the admissibility standard set forth in
the Federal Rules of Evidence and famously
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explicated in the case of Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993). Daubert, as
discussed further below, establishes a scientiﬁc
threshold for the admission of ostensibly scientiﬁcally based expert evidence. In particular, the Daubert court instructed trial courts to
consider, among other things, whether the basis for scientiﬁc expert opinion had been adequately tested and whether the testing had
been methodologically sound (with help in that
evaluation coming from peer review and publication), had acceptable error rates, and was
generally accepted in the pertinent ﬁeld. Remarkably, the Havvard court took these indicators of good science and converted them into
crime investigation and litigation markers. On
the issues of falsiﬁcation and whether the techniques are testable or have been tested, the
court wrote that “[t]hey have been tested in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible
stakes,” as if the stakes and not the research design, methods, and analysis are the key to sound
empirical research. On the issue of “peer review and publication,” the court confused the
process of fundamental knowledge building in
a science with the practice of examiners checking each other’s everyday casework. The court
stated that “the methods of identiﬁcation are
subject to peer review. [A]nother qualiﬁed examiner can compare the objective information
upon which the opinion is based and may render
a different opinion if warranted. In fact, peer review is the standard operating procedure among
latent print examiners.” Although there was no
research to review, there still was peer review,
the court suggested. The court excused the absence of published research by saying again that
“latent ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation has been subject to adversarial testing for roughly 100 years,
again in cases with the highest stakes possible.” On the issue of error rates, the court was
told that ﬁngerprint examiners never make errors. Although it disbelieved the government’s
“breathtaking” claim that “the error rate for the
method is zero,” the court made what it considered a “reasonable concession” that occasional
mistakes “can of course” occur. It admitted the
evidence.
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Thus, in U.S. v. Havvard (2000), the court
substituted courtroom debate for scientiﬁc research in an effort to justify admission. Following this strange exercise, the judge declared
this expert evidence to be “the very archetype
of reliable expert testimony under [Daubert]”
(p. 855).
In another ﬁngerprint case, U.S. v. LleraPlaza II (2002), the court acknowledged the
gaping absence of empirical research testing the
claims of ﬁngerprint examiners, but it searched
for some reason, any reason, to admit the expertise. The judge in U.S. v. Cline (2002) took
the view that the Supreme Court could not
have wanted the nonscience forensic sciences,
such as asserted ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation, to
be excluded, and therefore, notwithstanding
Daubert’s apparent commands, soundness (validity, reliability) of the evidence could not be
the touchstone of admission. Consequently, in
the Cline court’s view, given the serious shortcomings in the scientiﬁc foundations of ﬁngerprint expert evidence, alternative, less rigorous,
criteria would have to be employed in order to
facilitate admission. Put differently: If the student cannot pass the test, the test has to be made
as easy as it needs to be to ensure that the student can pass it. A review of the many cases in
which courts wrestled with challenges to ﬁngerprint expert testimony summed up those courts’
opinions (in which they could not ﬁnd bases
for admission that comported with the requirements of Daubert and Kumho Tire, but nevertheless found various ways to rule the testimony
admissible) as amounting to “a catalog of evasions” (Faigman et al. 2008, chapter 32, § 32:3).
These cases, and the many others that might
be cited (see, generally, Faigman et al. 2008),
well illustrate courts’ limited understanding of
the basics of science. These limitations, however, were little on display until fairly recently.
As noted above, in 1993 the Supreme Court
changed the fundamental orientation federal
judges use for evaluating the admissibility of
expert evidence. Prior to Daubert, courts that
used any articulated test at all used one that was
deferential to the professionals from the pertinent ﬁeld, a test most famously associated with
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the case of Frye v. U.S. (1923). The Frye test
queried whether the knowledge or technique
on which the scientiﬁc opinion depended was
“generally accepted in the particular ﬁeld” from
which it came. (For a detailed review of Frye
and its comparison with Daubert, see Saks &
Faigman 2005.) Frye and similar tests seemed to
require no special scientiﬁc acumen. Daubert, in
contrast, changed the primary focus from what
was accepted by those who practiced in the ﬁeld
to whether the methodology and principles underlying the expert opinion were reliable and
valid. The Daubert analysis, which was subsequently codiﬁed in amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 2000, requires a fair degree of scientiﬁc sophistication to be conducted
well. Courts lacking such sophistication, however, have turned the test into something of a
caricature.
When Daubert was ﬁrst decided (see Saks
& Faigman 2005), no consensus existed among
courts or commentators about whether the new
test loosened or tightened the judicial ﬁltering
of such testimony. It is probably fair to say that,
initially, most observers believed the test was
less stringent. But as courts applied the test, it
turned out to be more stringent because many
expert opinions that had been routinely admitted turned out, upon inspection, to have little
data and poor research methods behind them.
As applied, therefore, Daubert seemed to raise
the threshold for scientiﬁc evidence. Courts,
however, made an exception for the nonscience
forensic sciences, for which the test has usually
been applied so as to make it as undemanding
as necessary to facilitate admission.
This strange mosaic can be understood only
by considering two major planes, each of which
is itself somewhat paradoxical: what Daubert
does (rather than what it says) and what judges
do when they apply that law (something that
legal realists conceived as the law on the books
versus the law in action). (For a more thorough review and analysis of these issues, see
Saks & Faigman 2005; Faigman et al. 2008,
chapter 1.) On the plane of law, Frye required
that a proffered expertise be generally accepted
within its ﬁeld, whereas Daubert requires that

the basis for proffered expertise be demonstrably sound, valid, and reliable. Thus, Daubert
ought more readily to admit expert testimony
that has a sound basis even if it has not yet
gained general acceptance, whereas Frye would
more readily admit expert testimony that had
come to be generally accepted even though it
has no demonstrably sound basis. No family of
asserted expertises falls more clearly into the
category of simultaneously being generally accepted (at least within their own orbit) and yet
lacking any demonstrably sound basis than the
nonscience forensic sciences. Thus, logically,
these ﬁelds ought to have been more readily
admitted by Frye and more readily excluded
by Daubert. On the plane of judicial behavior, however, although the switch from Frye to
Daubert led to more intense scrutiny and more
frequent exclusion of expert testimony in civil
cases, something quite different occurred on the
criminal side.
Judges have, in general, bent over backwards
to evade the application of Daubert when conscientious application would lead to the exclusion of any of the nonscience forensic sciences. For example, upon realizing that asserted
handwriting identiﬁcation expertise (FDE, or
forensic document examination) had no sound
scientiﬁc basis, the court in U.S. v. Starzecpyzel
(1995) declared:
Were the Court to apply Daubert to the
proffered FDE testimony, it would have to
be excluded. This conclusion derives from
a straightforward analysis of the suggested
Daubert factors—testability and known error
rate, peer review and publication, and general
acceptance—in light of the evidence adduced
at the Daubert hearing (p. 1036).

Seeing where Daubert led, the court looked
for a way to get off of Daubert’s path. In the end,
the court reasoned that FDE lacked scientiﬁc
validity; because it lacked scientiﬁc validity, it
was not subject to Daubert review; and because
it was not subject to Daubert, it was admissible.
Were it a sound science, it would have been
admissible; because it was not a sound science,
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it was admissible. This solution was followed
by numerous federal courts until it was implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999), holding
that all ﬁelds of asserted expertise, whether labeled science or anything else, had to meet serious and appropriate criteria of soundness or be
excluded.
One would have expected that after nearly
a century of admission as evidence in courts,
when ﬁnally called upon to defend the scientiﬁc foundations of their claims in court, ﬁngerprint examiners would be able to roll wheelbarrows ﬁlled with studies and data into court
to prove the bases for their claims. But they
had nothing. Their expert testimony had been
presented in American courts since early in the
twentieth century, having been admitted ﬁrst
by courts that applied no real test of validity,
and then by courts that relied on those earlier
courts as precedent of a sort (Saks 1998). After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert
(1993) and Kumho Tire (1999), challenges began
to be laid (see Saks & Faigman 2005). Amazingly, the ﬁrst empirical studies subjecting the
basic claims of ﬁngerprint examiners to empirical testing did not occur until the midst of the
pretrial phase of the ﬁrst of those post-Daubert
challenges, U.S. v. Mitchell (2000). The judge in
that case simply ruled, without a written opinion, that ﬁngerprints were admissible. The ﬁrst
court to use the record developed for Mitchell in
a formal opinion ruled ﬁngerprint expert opinions on individual identity to be inadmissible
(U.S. v. Llera-Plaza I 2002). The same court reversed itself several months later, admitting the
testimony, though it continued to ﬁnd that virtually no research existed supporting the claims
of ﬁngerprint experts (U.S. v. Llera-Plaza II
2002).
State courts have been similarly wide-eyed
in their assessments of the nonscience forensic
sciences. In a case involving a challenge to the
admission of expert testimony on microscopic
hair comparison, for example, the Kentucky
Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Johnson
(1999), purported to apply a Daubert analysis
to admissibility. Because the court had no
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relevant data of any kind in the record before
it, the proffered expertise could not meet any
of the Daubert criteria—except perhaps general
acceptance. But the court also could ﬁnd no evidence of general acceptance, and so it relied on
its own past cases from decades earlier for the
conclusion that microscopic hair identiﬁcation
examination passes general acceptance muster.
It turns out, however, that those earlier cases
said nothing about general acceptance. The
Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged this
fact but reasoned that those courts “must have”
implicitly found general acceptance or they
would not have admitted the hair identiﬁcation
evidence. The ﬂaw in this reasoning was that
Kentucky had not adopted Frye or any other
version of general acceptance until after those
cases had been decided. Through this sleight
of hand—forming grounds for admission out
of thin air—the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that microscopic hair identiﬁcation satisﬁed
Daubert.
In another state case, involving asserted expertise in voiceprint identiﬁcation, Alaska v.
Coon (1999)—the very case by which the Alaska
Supreme Court adopted Daubert as its test of
admission—the court remanded the case to the
trial court to take additional evidence in anticipation of adopting and applying Daubert, but
no court involved in the case at any level built
its holding on any relevant research studies or
other data. Undaunted, in another magical judicial opinion, the Alaska court conjured the
bases for admission out of nothing.
The problem has not merely been judges
who cannot bring themselves to follow the law
to its logical conclusion if doing so will result in an outcome that makes them nervous.
Judges in criminal cases are not likely to have
the opportunity to hear many challenges because lawyers in criminal cases are much less
likely than lawyers in civil cases to mount challenges to the other side’s scientiﬁc expert evidence (Risinger 2000). This is a reﬂection of
the familiar sociological and institutional differences between civil and criminal cases.
Some courts have accepted the command of
federal or state versions of Daubert and ruled as
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required by those tests. This was true especially
in regard to asserted handwriting identiﬁcation
expertise. Following Kumho Tire, most federal
courts that thoughtfully examined this evidence
followed the path of U.S. v. Hines (1999), which
held that experts could not testify regarding the
identity of the author of a questioned document. These courts limited the expert to “showand-tell” descriptive statements regarding similarities and differences between the known
and unknown exemplars. Indeed, in some circumstances, courts excluded the testimony of
forensic document examiners entirely (U.S. v.
Saelee 2001, U.S. v. Fujii 2000; for a more complete discussion, see Faigman et al. 2008, chapter 33). Several courts ruled that ﬁngerprint
identiﬁcation expert opinions on identity are
mostly inadmissible (U.S. v. Llera Plaza I 2002)
(though later reversed) or completely excluded
(Maryland v. Rose 2007).
But at the end of the day, these cases are
small islands of inadmissibility surrounded by a
sea of admission. As one commentator summed
up this seascape: “It seems that the only standard the courts are requiring of forensic science
is that it be incriminating to the defendant”
(Frisbie & Garrett, 1998, p. 56, quoting John
Marshall Law School Professor Melvin B.
Lewis). In essence, the nonscience forensic
sciences are granted exemption from serious
scrutiny. Despite the hopes of the framers of our
Constitution, the decisions of individual judges
are not made in a vacuum insulated from pressures of various kinds. This is not to say that the
pressures are improper or illegal. The spotlight
focused by the news media on an unusual (even
if unusually correct) decision, or the shrillness
of pleas from the government when it loses, or
considerations internal to the judicial branch
can impel judges to decide in ways other than
what they believe to be correct. For a noteworthy example, consider the opinion of the judge
in U.S. v. Green (2005), a case involving ﬁrearms
identiﬁcation, where the proffered expert insisted he could identify the suspect weapon “to
the exclusion of all others in the world” despite
being unable to offer any basis for believing that

to be true. In admitting the testimony, albeit
only partially, the court wrote:
I reluctantly [admit the proffered expert testimony] because of my conﬁdence that any
other decision will be rejected by appellate
courts, in light of precedents across the country, regardless of the ﬁndings I have made.
While I recognize that the Daubert-Kumho
standard does not require the illusory perfection of a television show (CSI, this wasn’t),
when liberty hangs in the balance—and, in the
case of the defendants facing the death penalty,
life itself—the standards should be higher than
were met in this case, and than have been imposed across the country. The more courts
admit this type of toolmark evidence without
requiring documentation, proﬁciency testing,
or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy
practices will endure; we should require more
(p. 109).

Indeed, we should.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE
In Hans Christian Andersen’s famous tale, “the
Emperor walked in the procession under the
lovely canopy, while all the crowds in the street
and all the people at their windows said, ‘Heavens, How marvelous the Emperor’s new clothes
look!’” The crowd, in fact, saw that the emperor
had no clothes, but feared saying so: “No one
wanted it thought that he could not see anything, as that would make him somebody who
was either very stupid or badly ﬁtted for his position.” A little child, however, spoke up: “‘But
he has nothing on!’” The crowd realized that
the child was right and all began to shout: “‘He
has nothing on!’” The emperor realized it, too.
He “cringed inside himself, for it seemed to him
that they were right, but he thought like this: ‘I
shall have to go through with the procession’”
(Andersen 1959, pp. 30–32).
Many nonscience forensic scientists are in
the same situation as the emperor. They have
“nothing on.” At this point in time, of course,
they continue in the procession as testifying
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experts because, like the emperor, they cannot
admit the reality. To stop would reveal them to
be “either very stupid or badly ﬁtted for [their]
position.” Change, if it is to occur, must come
from outside the nonscience forensic sciences.
There are two courses of action that might
lead to wholesale reform in the practice of
forensic science: First, the courts need to become better consumers of expert testimony and
demand better methods than so far have been
forthcoming; second, mainstream academic scientists must join the effort to test forensic hypotheses. Although many other reforms might
accompany these two, both are essential to any
true changes. Otherwise, these naked experts
will continue to march on, with their “chamberlains . . . behind [them] carrying the train that
was not there at all.”
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Gatekeeping Courts
In some respects, the problems endemic in the
forensic sciences must be understood in terms
of market failure (Faigman 1999). The manufacturers of forensic knowledge produce inferior products, and the buyers (largely courts)
continue to purchase them. Reform, therefore,
can be imagined in regard to both the supply and the demand of the forensic product.
Although it probably does not matter greatly
which factor is revolutionized ﬁrst, true change
cannot take place unless the practices of both
sellers and buyers change. We begin with the
buyers.
To a large extent, the revolution has already occurred in the law, but many of the
revolutionaries still do not realize how pervasive the reforms have been, at least in principle. Daubert largely put in place the procedural
framework that would permit courts to see nonscience forensic science for what it is. The key
paradigm shift wrought by Daubert was to require courts to consider the methods and principles that supported expert evidence, not simply inquire about its general acceptance among
some insular group of true believers (Faigman
2000, Saks & Koehler 2005). The gatekeeping
metaphor was ﬁrst described in Daubert itself.
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Largely explicit in the decision, the Court contemplated that judges were charged with the responsibility to understand science well enough
to measure the scientiﬁc validity (i.e., “evidentiary reliability”) of proffered expert opinion.
This responsibility led Chief Justice Rehnquist
to complain that Daubert would require federal
judges “to become amateur scientists” (Daubert,
p. 601). And indeed they must (Faigman 2006).
Science is such a pervasive force in modern
society that judges are essentially failing their
obligations if they persist in their scientiﬁc ignorance. This task, in fact, is not profoundly
difﬁcult, at least in the forensics area. In most
cases, recognizing the weaknesses of nonscience
forensic science is not rocket science. Much
of the expert opinion propounded in court has
not been tested beyond mere anecdotal experience and is not supported by adequate research
designs or basic statistical testing. Moreover,
texts and treatises are available that detail the
numerous and profound failings of these nonsciences (see Faigman et al. 2008, Giannelli &
Imwinkelried 2007).
Just why the courts have so utterly failed
to carry out their gatekeeping duties is difﬁcult to say. We can only speculate about possible reasons for this dereliction. The two main
possibilities are lack of knowledge or lack of
will. We believe the latter is more likely, for
several reasons. First, as noted, the failures of
the nonscience forensic sciences are so profound and so elementary that they are just not
that difﬁcult to understand. Second, the same
judges who demur from their gatekeeping obligations when prosecutors proffer bad forensics
are vigorous gatekeepers when considering bad
expertise proffered by plaintiffs in civil cases.
It is hard to believe that judges who minutely
criticize plaintiffs’ epidemiological proof cannot understand that prosecutors’ latent ﬁngerprint evidence lacks scientiﬁc validation. Finally, so many of the judicial opinions dealing
with forensic evidence employ such tortured
logic that it is impossible to believe that courts
are blind to the empirical realities of this evidence. It appears, therefore, that lack of will is
a better explanation than plain ignorance.
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There are, of course, many credible reasons
why courts should lack courage in this context.
Foremost, perhaps, they fear that excluding
any forensic expertise that lacks a scientiﬁc basis will result in wholesale exclusion of substantial portions of prosecutors’ cases. This could
lead to the disruption of large numbers of
cases and lead prosecutors not to pursue other
cases. Moreover, it would potentially throw into
doubt hundreds, if not thousands, of past cases,
possibly setting off a ﬁrestorm of habeas petitions seeking to overturn convictions based on
now-excluded forensic evidence. In individual
cases, where courts are convinced from other
evidence that a defendant is guilty, they will
see no need to scrutinize the forensic evidence
closely because (if it too inculpates) they will
assume it is correct. Evaluating science, for its
own sake, is not the purpose of judicial proceedings. Finally, courts legitimately see no present
alternative to this proof. Whatever its weaknesses, courts probably think it has to be admitted until something better comes along.
From the perspective of courts, therefore,
the current state of the art of forensic science
cannot be jettisoned until a new state of the art is
available. Yet, it also appears that without courts
raising serious doubts about current practices,
there is little pressure for the forensics ﬁeld to
change course. As a consequence, the status quo
will persist until something intervenes. If neither the courts nor the forensic experts are likely
to change things, the only group left is the mainstream scientiﬁc community. It is there that real
reform in forensics can take place.

Scientific Gate-Makers
In light of the prevailing practice in forensic
science, there is little reason to believe that the
ﬁeld will soon begin a comprehensive and rigorous research program. Indeed, even if the ﬁeld
generally recognized the need for such a program, it is not at all clear that it has the wherewithal to even begin this work. Most professional forensic experts are employed by state
or private laboratories that apply forensic technology, not produce it. Existing laboratories are

not likely to have the time, resources, or inclination to vigorously test the technology they
employ daily. Such an effort would certainly appear to them as a waste of time and money. Why
test what already works, at least insofar as “what
works” is measured by its acceptance in court?
More problematic still, today’s forensic scientists are generally not trained as researchers;
they are technicians. A study of crime laboratory personnel found that fewer than 1% had
PhD-level research degrees and that only about
3% had earned a master’s degree (Furton et al.
1999). The overwhelming majority of forensic
professionals simply do not have the statistical
or methodological training to do original research. Hence, if good science is to be brought
to bear on forensic hypotheses, mainstream academic scientists will have to take the laboring
oar.
At least two ingredients are necessary to interest academic scientists in the study of forensic issues: money and relevance. The ﬁrst is relatively easily explained, if not readily obtained.
Research, quite simply, follows the money.
Historically, little government ﬁnancing has
been available for basic forensic science research. Agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of
Health do not include forensics as part of their
mission statements. Probably the single agency
most devoted to funding forensic research is the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), an arm of the
Justice Department. Thus far, NIJ has not been
successful in funding cutting-edge research.
Finally, because academic scientists have not
considered forensics to be within their bailiwick, they have not asked for money to do
this kind of research. Clearly, before academic
scientists can be expected to reform forensic science, they must be convinced that the subject is
relevant and important to their day jobs.
Although the question of the relevance of
forensics to various mainstream scientiﬁc communities is too large to canvass fully here, just
brief contemplation on the subject provides a
clear answer. Forensics provides a treasure trove
of research possibilities. Statisticians, in particular, would ﬁnd a surplus of hypotheses to test in
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areas such as latent ﬁngerprints, ﬁrearms identiﬁcation, and handwriting analysis. Indeed,
conventional statistical subjects such as patternrecognition and signal detection theory could
be tested and applied to forensic problems.
Moreover, many scientists would ﬁnd forensics to be a fertile area to test general theories
from their disciplines. The work of Dror and
colleagues—psychologists interested in studying cognitive biases—is a particularly good illustration of this. The list matching forensic
subjects to established academic departments is
limited only by one’s scientiﬁc imagination.
In the short term, mainstream science has
the potential to reform forensic science through
the efforts of individual scientists (e.g., Zabell
2005) and the contributions of select scientiﬁc organizations. In particular, the National
Research Council of the National Academies of
Science has played, and could continue to play, a
pivotal role in both evaluating the state of the art
of forensic science and in making recommendations for the future (e.g., National Research
Council 1992, 1996). In the long term, however, only with substantial funding and the concerted efforts of dedicated individuals will the
nonscience forensic sciences become scientiﬁc.
Perhaps one day forensic science will become
another subject in the vast scientiﬁc curriculum
of major research universities.
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CONCLUSION
We have explored the state of nonscience
forensic science—the absence of basic-science
origins, unsupported assumptions, exaggerated
claims, lack of empirical testing, little use of
scientiﬁc method, pretermission of error. And
we have discussed the interplay of nonscience
forensic science with illusory judicial oversight,
as well as the indifference of normal science toward forensic science.
Let us conclude by imagining what forensic science would look like if it had grown up
in the world of conventional basic and applied
science, as typically found in the departments
and laboratories of universities and industry
and many government agencies. And, there168
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fore, what might it look like if in the future
it could be set on a path toward that world,
whether by its own initiative, under the incentives of courts conscientiously applying Daubert
and its progeny, by the restructuring of the way
forensic services are organized (Koppl 2005), or
by normal scientists becoming seriously interested in the subject?
The underlying assumptions of forensic
identiﬁcation would be subjected to intense
questioning and empirical testing. In the course
of this work, researchers would report what
they tested, how they tested it, and what they
found. Their results—whether good, bad, or
indifferent—would be reported with equal candor. Because many of these areas (handwriting,
ﬁrearms, tiremarks, etc.) had no basic science
from which to draw, these researchers would
be building the science that would be the foundation of forensic science.
The individualization techniques that
emerged would probably resemble DNA
typing, with its measurement of attributes,
sampling of variation in populations, and
statistical bases. Error rates, probability levels,
conﬁdence intervals, and so on would be
natural parts of what developed. The elements
of subjectivity in forensic examination would
themselves be topics of research, the better
to understand their operation and how to
tame them. These scientists, like most, would
recognize problems of experimenter and
observer effects; their own research would use
procedures designed to prevent such effects, as
would the procedures they designed for use in
crime labs.
Those doing this research would be doctoral scientists and their graduate students, assisted by novices, some of whom would become
the scientists and technicians who would later
staff the crime labs applying the techniques being developed. Incompetence, error, and fraud
would be minimized by the various cultural and
organizational features of the scientiﬁc enterprise that have evolved, though sometimes such
problems would still arise. Deliberate fraud is a
career-ending act. At the end of the day, errors
(whatever their cause) are revealed by the failure
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of ﬁndings to replicate. All this work would provide the science for forensic science.
As the knowledge became ready for “prime
time” (and as newer knowledge and developments improved upon older), it would be
adopted for casework in crime labs. It is anyone’s guess how crime labs would be organized
in such a world, but they likely would inherit
some of the culture of the conventional scientiﬁc world along with the knowledge base
drawn from that world. This might include
an ethos of candor, a dedication to data above
all else, and therefore a hostility toward incompetence or fudging or fraud. It might also
include closer and more reciprocal relationships with basic researchers, attentiveness to

new ﬁndings, and an alertness to problems in
need of further basic and applied research. Because much of the knowledge probably will have
been grown in universities, there would be more
college courses in these subjects (indeed, there
would be a larger body of scientiﬁc knowledge
to teach, more than techniques and assumptions). Personnel would arrive at crime labs with
more and better education in relevant subjects.
A more highly trained doctoral- and master’slevel cadre of lab directors and managers would
come into being and would more readily move
between the worlds of research and casework.
These labs and their personnel would be both
more welcoming of oversight, review, accreditation, and certiﬁcation and less in need of it.
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Figure 1
Postmortem analysis of causes of wrongful conviction in cases of DNA exonerations.
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